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ABSTRACT
Malicious software is rampant on the Internet and costs billions of dollars
each year. Safe and thorough analysis of malware is key to protecting vul-
nerable systems and cleaning those that have already been infected. Most
current state-of-the-art analysis platforms run alongside the malware, in-
creasing their detectability. This reduces the value of analysis because some
malware is known to behave differently when being analyzed. Virtualiza-
tion offers a compelling platform for malware analysis, with strong isolation
and the ability to save and restore guest state. Commodity virtual machine
monitors (VMMs), however, are not designed for malware analysis. Due to
their complexity, they often fail to provide transparency and even expose
vulnerabilities which could be exploited by the malware running inside guest
system.
We design and implement a lightweight VMM (namely MAVMM) that
is created specially for one job: malware analysis. MAVMM does not im-
plement unnecessary virtualization features commonly found in general pur-
pose hypervisors, including virtual device emulation. We take advantage of
hardware virtualization support to make MAVMM more simple, secure and
transparent. In this thesis, we describe the design and implementation of
MAVMM, and the features that we can extract from programs running in-
side the guest OS. We evaluate our platform in three aspects: functionality,
detectability and performance. We show that our system can extract useful
information from malicious software, and that it is not susceptible to known
virtualization detection techniques.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Malware - a representative term for viruses, worms, spyware, trojan horses,
adware and rootkits - is a major threat to today’s highly connected computing
environments. Annual damage from malware is estimated to be more than
10 billion dollars [1], more than 40 percent of companies worldwide report
business disruptions due to malware [2], and 55% of all online users believe
their systems had been infected [3]. All signs point toward malware becoming
a more significant threat in the future.
Malware analysis plays a crucial role in countering this trend. Through
detailed analysis of a particular malicious application, security researchers
will be able to gain insight into its intention, its runtime behaviors, and
the risk that it creates. This knowledge is very valuable in predicting the
threats posed by the malware, creating appropriate anti-virus signatures,
developing tools to patch infected systems, and in some cases tracing back
to the criminal behind it. Traditional tools for malware analysis include
disassemblers [4], debuggers [5], and black box analysis such as function call
tracing (e.g., strace) and network sniffers [6]. While these methods are useful
to some extent, each suffers from certain drawbacks. Disassembling, like
other static analysis techniques, can be circumvented by packing or dynamic
code translation [7, 8]. Dynamic black box analysis only gives an incomplete
view of the malware’s behaviors. Debugging, on the other hand, provides a
more exhaustive view but is vulnerable to debugger fingerprinting [9, 10]. As
malware gets more and more complex, it is often impractical and unnecessary
to analyze each and every instruction.
Another common approach in malware analysis is to deploy analyzing tools
in conjunction with virtualization technology, taking advantage of its strong
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isolation, and its ability to take snapshots and roll back the guest’s state. In
addition, VMM-based analyzers have a unique ability to monitor virtual ma-
chine based rootkits [11, 12]. Commodity virtual machine monitors (VMMs)
such as Xen and VMWare have already been used in malware analysis [13, 14].
Unfortunately, we are facing an advanced and intelligent enemy. Malware
writers have deployed increasingly complex techniques to evade detection and
prevent forensic analysis, using side channels [15] or artifacts of the virtual-
ization platform [16, 17]. When the malware detects it is running inside a
virtual machine, it often exits to prevent further analysis. Recent malware,
such as the infamous Storm and some versions of Conficker are known to
behave in this fashion [18, 19]. Other types of malware even try to act differ-
ently to fool analyzers of their intention [20] Therefore, detectability of the
virtualization platform will greatly affect accuracy of the analysis system.
General purpose VMMs, including Xen and VMWare, are inherently not
suitable for this task. They are designed for functionality and performance,
not transparency. For example, to support virtualization of multiple guest
systems at the same time, commodity VMMs need to implement virtual
device emulation. This usually leads to the inclusion of a host OS with
millions of lines of code inside the trusted computing base (TCB) of the
VMM. Their large footprint and their complexity reduce their transparency.
A recent study by Garfinkel et al. [21] shows that device emulation is the
main source of logical and timing discrepancies between virtualized and non-
virtualized environment.
Putting detectability aside, commodity VMMs which are loaded with fea-
tures, also expose many vulnerabilities that could be exploited by the mal-
ware under analysis to escalate privileges, DOS the analysis platform, or
bypass security restrictions. There have been at least 17 known vulnerabil-
ities in Xen 3.x, 42 in VMware Workstation 6.x, and 165 in VMware ESX
Server 3.x [22, 23, 24]. If the VMM layer can be easily compromised, it
becomes very risky to trust the analysis platform based upon it.
1.2 Problem Description and Contributions
In this thesis, we design, implement, and evaluate the architecture of MAVMM,
a VMM specially built for malware analysis. By taking advantage of hardware-
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support for virtualization [25, 26] and focusing only on malware analysis
functionality, we were able to keep MAVMM small and simple. The TCB
of our system is 2 to 3 order of magnitude smaller than other VMM-based
malware analysis platforms. Our goals for this work are:
• Ability to extract useful data for malware analysis.
• Minimum trust in the guest OS.
• Simplicity and compactness for the VMM, which improves transparency
and security.
MAVMM works by extracting runtime analysis data, which we will refer to
as features, from the monitored guest application. The features that we ex-
tract from the guest OS include both fine-grained information and high-level
information: execution traces, memory dumps, system calls, disk accesses,
and network interactions. These features can then be used by malware ana-
lyzers to create a fairly complete picture of the malware.
While complete undetectability is most likely a panacea [21], our system is
qualitatively more difficult to detect than simply running analysis tools along-
side the malware or using a commodity virtualization system. In addition,
our experiments show that common methods used to detect virtualization
are ineffective against MAVMM. Our main contributions can be summarized
as follows:
• We propose a more transparent and secure malware analysis architec-
ture, using a purpose-built VMM and hardware virtualization support.
• We implement a prototype system, demonstrate that MAVMM can
extract useful data, and that common VMM detection techniques are
ineffective against it.
• We open the source code of our VMM and give other researchers ac-
cess to it. Beside malware analysis, this simple hypervisor with hard-
ware supported VMM introspection will be useful for auditing, log-
ging & replaying, and many other purposes. Our code is accessible at
mavmm.sourceforge.net
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1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 examines some of the related works in. We present the general
design of MAVMM in chapter 3 and describe specific implementation details
in chapter 4. We present our evaluations and their results in chapter 5 and
conclude with chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORKS
A significant motivation for our project is prior works on malware analysis in
non-virtualized environment, including in-guest debugger [5] and dissasem-
bler [4]. Those techniques, however, can be avoided through various number
of methods such as packing/encryption, code obfuscation [8], and debugger
detection [10]. More advanced systems include OS based platforms such as
Saffron [8], and emulator based analyzers such as Renovo [7]. Saffron uses dy-
namic instrumentation and a newly developed page fault assisted debugger,
while Renovo and BitBlaze [27] ultilize whole-system emulation. However,
they only provide a way to debug / unpack malware whereas MAVMM offers
a more complete analysis platform. Moreover, non-virtualized analyzers are
very likely to create detectable side effects, especially when they operate un-
der the the assumption that the guest OS can be compromised. Our goals of
minimal detectability and no trust on the guest, including guest OS, cannot
be accomplished in this environment.
Virtualization offers a strong protection through isolation, and the ability
to save and rollback guest state to aid live debugging. VM introspection, the
process of examining a process inside a virtual machine from its VMM, was
introduced by Garfinkle and Rosenblum [28]. While other works have lever-
aged this idea for security purposes, such as process tracking [29], intrusion
detection [30, 31], malware detection [32], and honeypots [33, 34, 35], our
work focuses on harware-supported introspection for malware analysis.
Because virtual machines have been used commonly by malware analyzers,
virtualization detection techniques have become a part of modern malware.
The techniques that malware program use range from a simple IDT based
detection [15] to complicated TLB sizing or timing attacks [21, 17]. These
results show that any software virtualization platform will introduce some
detectable changes to the guest system. We, therefore, utilize the hardware
virtualization support to achieve our goal of minimal detectability. Since it
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is known to be harder to detect hardware virtualization, malware is unlikely
to go to great length to detect and avoid hardware virtualization platform if
by doing so exposes itself to malware detectors.
Several researches are utilizing hardware virtualization. KVM [36] uses
kernel modules to create a hypervisor on top of Linux, but it is based on
QEMU’s I/O model which is known to be detectable [37, 17]. A recent work
by Dinaburg et al, Ether [14], is perhaps the project most closely related to
ours. Ether make use of Xen HVM and its support for Intel VT hardware
virtualization technology for malware analysis. Intel VT, however, does not
support nested paging and DMA protection at the time this project is im-
plemented. This is the reason why we decided to use AMD SVM instead of
Intel VT. Using Xen makes it much easier to develop Ether, since the ana-
lyzer does not have to worry about boot-strapping itself and the guest OS,
protecting its integrity, or retrieving analysis data, etc... But this benefit
comes at the cost of having a huge TCB. Ether’s trusted computing base
includes Xen and an additional domain0 OS with many unnecessary func-
tionalities. As we will show in this thesis, general purpose VMMs are not
appropriate for malware analysis. We on the other hand, use a lightweight
and customized VMM which is specially designed for this purpose.
Another interesting line of works uses a thin layer of hypervisor to en-
force guest security policies [38], to help reducing the TCB size of guest
applications [39], or to implement a low level rootkit and hide its malicious
behaviours [12]. Our work also focuses on separating functionalities and keep-
ing TCB at minimum, but we target a different application which presents a
different set of technical challenges.
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CHAPTER 3
SYSTEM DESIGN
To develop our architecture, we study various techniques for virtualizing the
system, extracting analytic features from the guest and communicating with
the analysis platform. In this chapter, we present the high level design of
MAVMM and explain our design decisions. Our design is independent of
virtualization platform (AMD SVM/Intel VT) and guest operating system
(OS). We describe implementation related details, that are specific to AMD
SVM and Linux, in chapter 4.
3.1 Hardware Virtualization Technology
Both AMD and Intel currently offer hardware virtualization support in their
processors, including the mainstream Intel Core2 Duo and AMD Opteron.
Hardware virtualization provides faster virtualization performance, and sev-
eral features to simplify VMM implementations, and therefore is a natural
choice for MAVMM. For the purpose of malware analysis, our hypervisor
mainly takes advantage of the following features offered by hardware virtu-
alization [25]: an additional CPU mode for the hypervisor, nested paging,
address space identifiers (ASID), an IOMMU, and event interception and
injection.
3.2 Special Purpose Hypervisor
One of our primary goals is to keep the hypervisor thin and lean, as we be-
lieve simplicity will aid transparency and security. Even though commodity
VMMs, such as Xen, KVM or VMware, use hardware virtualization, their
code bases are still too large and complex for our purpose. All of them include
a general purpose OS inside their TCB, and implement many virtualization
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features that are not necessary for malware analysis. Needless to say, this
complexity is a fruitful land for software bugs. A recent study shows that
programs usually contain between 6 and 16 bugs per 1,000 lines of executable
code [40], while another puts the number at 2 to 75 depending on module
size [41]. Indeed, there are known attacks that break VMM sandboxes from
the guest environment, allowing attackers to take control of the hypervisor
and the host OS [22, 23, 24, 42]. This situation is clearly undesirable in
VMM-based malware analysis. Once the malware has taken control of the
hypervisor, it is very likely that it will find a way to break into the analysis
platform. This observation led us to the most important design decision in
this project: design a new, special purpose VMM instead of instrumenting
a commodity VMM with malware analysis capabilities. Unlike traditional
VMMs, MAVMM lets the guest interact directly with hardware for most of
its operations. The VMM only makes interception at a few places, in or-
der to protect its integrity and log the guest’s behaviors for later analysis.
A comparison between MAVMM and general purpose VMMs is shown in
Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Comparison between general purpose VMMs (left hand side)
and MAVMM (right hand side). The TCB is shaded. MAVMM lets most
hardware access requests go through without interception.
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3.3 Boot-strapping the Hypervisor
To get an accurate view of the monitored system’s activities, MAVMM needs
to start earlier and run at a higher CPU privilege level than the software
under analysis. Thus, we decide to boot MAVMM directly from a boot
loader. Another option is to run our VMM on top of or alongside a host OS,
similar to Xen [43], KVM [36], and VMWare Workstation [44]. The higher
level of abstraction provided by a host OS would make it easier to bootstrap
the VMM, however we choose to avoid it to keep our platform small and
simple.
3.4 Protecting Hypervisor Memory
MAVMM uses nested paging to protect its memory from being tampered by
the guest. Nested paging adds an additional layer to the hardware address
translation process. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Address translation process for a guest OS without nested
paging (1), and with nested paging (2).
From the perspective of the guest, guest physical addresses are the same
with hardware addresses of RAM chips. In reality, they are translated into
host physical addresses with assistance from a newly inserted nested page
table (NPT). By setting up the NPT appropriately, MAVMM can redirect
guest requests to access its memory region, and hide its existence. From this
point, we will refer to this region as the VMM region.
Paging redirection protects MAVMM from memory access by the CPU,
but it does not protect MAVMM from direct memory access (DMA). To
keep our hypervisor from being tampered with by external device DMA, we
use the IOMMU offered by hardware virtualization. IOMMU allows flexible
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control of each device’s view of the main memory. This is done by using a
translation table, to control the mapping from device virtual addresses to
memory physical addresses.
3.5 Feature Extraction
This section describes the information we glean from a running VM, our
techniques for exporting the data, and an optimization for avoiding logging
unnecessary states and events.
3.5.1 Features
It is important that MAVMM can extract useful data in addition to running
the malware safely and invisibly. We support extraction of the following
features from applications running inside the guest: fine-grained execution
trace, memory page, system call, disk access, and network access. These
features are the fundamental blocks upon which other analysis functions
could be implemented.
An execution trace provides the highest level of detail, similar to what a
run-time debugger can achieve. This information plays an important role in
understanding the malware’s internal operations. To get the execution trace
of a guest program, we single step through it’s execution and record each
instruction. We do so by virtualizing the TF flag within rflags register and
set it to 1. This would create an #DB exception, which could be intercepted
by MAVMM, after every guest instruction. We keep some state to learn
whether the guest or our VMM raised the TF flag. #DB exceptions created
by the guest should be forwarded to it, while the other ones need to be
processed transparently.
When intercepting events, such as system calls and network accesses,
MAVMM fetches guest pointers from memory. These pointers contain guest
logical addresses, and MAVMM needs to translate them into host physical
addresses before accessing the data that they point to. To translate a guest
logical address to the corresponding host physical address, we duplicate func-
tionality of the segmentation unit and the paging unit in software. Using the
guest’s segmentation and paging structure, MAVMM can translates a guest
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logical address to guest physical address. Because we use an identity map in
our nested page table, this guest physical address and its corresponding host
physical address are the same1. With this translated host physical address,
MAVMM is able to read the data from memory for further processing.
System calls are the main interface for software to interact with and make
changes to system state. A log of executed system calls is often good enough
to get a rough idea of what the malware is trying to do. MAVMM provides
the ability to record all system calls that a guest program invokes.
Most malware tries to gain access to network, either to propagate itself to
other hosts (worm), send out stolen data (spyware), or contact the master
for further instructions (bot). To remain persistent, malware often needs to
make changes to the hard disk. Therefore, network and disk monitoring are
crucial features. Using system call interception, MAVMM can track network
accesses and disk accesses as they happen.
3.5.2 Getting Analysis Data
One challenge that we face in our design process is how to get the data logged
by MAVMM out of the monitoring system, so that more analysis could be
done upon it. The key problem is that MAVMM allows the guest to retain
direct control of devices, so accessing I/O safely and invisibly requires careful
design.
We have several choices for extracting data from our analysis platform: use
the same hard-disk as the guest OS, use a separated hard disk, use an USB
flash drive, or use a system port such as the serial port. We decide to avoid
using the same hard disk with the guest system, to minimize detectability and
avoid possible contentions with the guest OS. We do not want to use guest
drivers to perform our I/O because, if compromised, the guest could alter our
analysis data. This leaves external USB drive and serial port communication
as the preferred methods for extracting data. For both external drive and
serial port, we can use BIOS services to dump the data out. We can also
implement a simple driver to access serial port devices directly without using
BIOS services.
1this is true except for VMM region
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3.5.3 Selective Analysis
We want the hypervisor to be as efficient and as unobtrusive as possible.
Thus, we enable full analysis capabilities only when necessary. For example,
analysis should be disabled when the guest OS is booting in clean state. As
a result, MAVMM has two operating modes: compact and full. In compact
mode, the hypervisor has most interceptions disabled and the monitored sys-
tem runs without considerable performance overhead. It only keeps activated
a few interceptions that are absolutely necessary for VMM protection. In full
mode, however, MAVMM intercepts and extracts all features mentioned in
Section 3.5.1.
MAVMM can selectively monitor specific processes and ignores other unim-
portant ones. This design removes unnecessary noises from the log and ac-
celerates overall analysis process. To monitor selective processes, MAVMM
needs to be notified each time a process switch takes place. It also needs a
mechanism to identify the next process that is going to be executed. In most
modern operating systems, each process has a separate virtual address space,
and a different paging structure. With support from hardware virtualization,
MAVMM intercepts any attempt to write to the paging base pointer2. This
allows our VMM to take control during process switches, right before the
incoming process get executed. MAVMM then uses VM introspection [28]
to get the name or process id of the next process, and compare it with a list
of processes that need to be monitored. If the next process is in this list,
MAVMM will enable full mode.
To track sub-processes created by an application under analysis, MAVMM
infers their names using system call tracing. When a monitored process
invokes a system call (e.g., fork) to create a new process, the newly created
process will be added to the monitoring list. Similar technique has been
demonstrated for tracking processes from a VMM in Antfarm [29].
2This pointer is stored in the CR3 register
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATION
In this chapter, we discuss specific details related to the hardware virtu-
alization technology and guest OS that we have chosen for our prototype
implementation. We choose AMD SVM technology mainly because it offers
more protection, and use Linux because of our familiarity with this OS. Nev-
ertheless, we believe that our system can support Intel VT and Windows.
We plan to implement this support in the future.
Initially, we started with TVMM [45], a small virtual machine monitor
built on top of AMD SVM. TVMM was a good starting point and we reuse
most of its header files, but it was an incomplete system incapable of booting
any real OS. Furthermore, TVMM does not support our analysis features.
4.1 Hardware Virtualization Technology
We decide to use the AMD Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) extensions for
MAVMM. Because the memory management unit (MMU) is on die, AMD
engineers are able to offer more advanced virtualization features than the
comparable extensions from Intel. AMD SVM natively supports nested pag-
ing in hardware. It also provides a convenient mechanism to reserve physical
memory from being accessed by DMA. In addition, AMD offers a simulation
environment (AMD Simnow) with many debugging supports, which will be
useful for our development and testing.
4.2 Boot-strapping
We use the GRUB boot loader to start our system. Our VMM executable
is stored in a simplified 32-bit ELF format readable by GRUB. We used
Xen’s mkelf32 utility to build this simplified ELF image from raw object
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files. When our system boots up, GRUB starts in host mode and begins
to load MAVMM. GRUB passes a multiboot info structure to MAVMM,
which defines the memory map, command line arguments, and any additional
parameters that we specified to GRUB.
Initially, we passed the guest OS image to our VMM using the module
parameter in GRUB configuration file and tried to execute this image di-
rectly from our hypervisor (similarly to TVMM [45]). This approach re-
quires MAVMM to initialize the booting environment to a state as expected
by the guest OS, and make sure that it does not overwrite the guest OS
image in memory while doing so. This turned out to be very complicated so
we changed to a different design. Instead of loading the guest OS directly,
MAVMM transfers control back to a second round of the GRUB boot loader.
This time GRUB will be started in guest mode to prepare the environment
and boot the virtualized guest OS. To do this, MAVMM sets the initial in-
struction pointer address of the guest to 0x7c00, after it has finished setting
up appropriate interceptions and protection mechanisms. 0x7c00 is the be-
ginning address of the loaded master boot record, which contains executable
code of GRUB boot loader.
4.3 Protecting Hypervisor Memory
For simplicity, we create a nested page table and fill it with an identity map-
ping from guest physical address to host physical address for all memory
pages available in the system, excluding the pages used by MAVMM itself.
When the guest tries to access this region, a nested page fault (#NP) excep-
tion will be raised by the CPU. MAVMM intercepts and handles this fault to
hide its existence. We virtualize the VMM region using additional space in
an external USB drive. Whenever the guest tries to access (read from / write
to) a memory location inside this region, MAVMM executes its request on
the additional space provided instead. If guest tries to query this USB port,
our hypervisor will intercept and return as if there is no device attached to
it.
To protect the VMM from being affected by external device DMA, we
use the Device Exclusion Vector (DEV) feature of AMD SVM. DEV is an
early version of IOMMU, which allows simple memory protection from DMA
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accesses. It uses a user-given bitmap to decide which memory pages are
available for external DMA. We simply mark the VMM region as unavailable,
and set one of the DEVBASE registers to our modified DEV using DEVCTL
PCI configuration space function block [25].
4.4 Features Extraction
4.4.1 System Call
Linux applications can invoke a system call in two different ways: by execut-
ing the interrupt (int) 0x80 assembly language instruction, or by executing
the sysenter instruction1. Similarly, the kernel can exit from a system call
by executing the iret or the sysexit assembly language instructions [46].
Linux uses the eax register to pass a system call number from a user pro-
gram to the kernel. The user mode process also finds return code of the
system call in the eax register. AMD SVM allows software interrupt INTn
and IRET instructions in the guest to be intercepted using control bits in
the Virtual Machine Control Block (VMCB) [25]. During a software inter-
rupt interception, the hypervisor first checks if the instruction is int 0x80.
AMD SVM allows us to intercept all software interrupts, but does not pro-
vide information on which specific vector number was called at the point
of interception. To test whether vector 0x80 was invoked, we fetch current
instruction’s opcode from the guest by walking through it’s paging table in
software. If it is indeed 0x80, our hypervisor reads the system call number
from eax register and process it accordingly. The intercepted software inter-
rupt is then injected into the guest before MAVMM passes control back to
it.
For some system calls, such as sys read, useful data is presented only after
the handler had finished its execution. To get the data that was actually read
from disk, we need to intercept sys read return using IRET interception. We
also need to maintain a mapping from the id of the thread which invoked
a system call to the system call that it executed. For sys read, this is the
pointer to the buffer where its ouput will be stored. This mapping is added
when MAVMM intercepts int 0x80 instructions. When an IRET takes place,
1sysenter is a recent addition and is only supported in 2.6 series Linux kernels
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MAVMM uses VMM introspection to get the ID of current thread. It then
looks up information about the system call that this thread invoked. If it is
a sys read, data located at the receive buffer along with the returned buffer
size will be logged.
In cases where both the CPU and Linux kernel can support sysenter/sysexit
instruction, the libc wrapper function may use them to invoke system calls,
as they are faster than INT and IRET. Intercepting sysenter/sysexit is a bit
more complicated since it is not directly supported by ADM SVM. However,
we can use a technique similar to Ether [14] for this task. We modify the
index in SYSENTER CS MSR to point to some unmapped segment, storing
its original value in a safe place. Each time sysenter is called, the CPU will
transfer control to this segment and create a #GP fault. MAVMM inter-
cepts this fault to get system call number and other arguments, then passes
control back to the guest using original SYSENTER CS MSR value, as if no
interception has occurred.
4.4.2 Network & File Access
In Linux, all network accesses are carried out by invoking sys socketcall,
which takes two parameters: func indicating which network system call to
execute, and args - an array of pointers to different parameters associated
with func. When sys socketcall is intercepted, the value of func and args are
located at CPU register ebx, and ecx accordingly. We can get the IP address
as well as the port number of the host to which the guest is communicating
with by looking at the sockaddr in structure specified in args. For each
network access, MAVMM records the IP addresses, port numbers, and data
involved.
File accesses can be monitored in a similar fashion through tracking of
sys read and sys write system calls. To facilitate analysis, we maintain a
mapping from descriptor numbers of opened files to their pathnames. We
update this map when intercepting returns of sys open and sys close.
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4.4.3 Getting Analysis Data
Given that we can use Simnow to bind a virtual serial port in the simulator to
a real port on the hosting system, we currently use a serial port for sending
out analysis data. Though it has low bandwidth, it serves as a proof-of-
concept for our ideas. A similar device hiding and I/O access mechanism
could be used for an external USB drive.
4.4.4 Selective Analysis
We implemented the MAVMM user control interface using a guest program
and VMMCALL instructions. Our program, mavmm-u, running inside the
guest makes VMMCALLs to communicate with the hypervisor. We use
this program to take fine-grained control of our tracking features, switching
between compact mode and full mode, and specifying the names of processes
that we want to track. Although mavmm-u is run inside the guest, we can
remove the binary file and evidences of its existence before executing the
malware.
To track sub-processes, we intercept Linux’s execve system call, which is
the backend of exec family of functions. We get the name of the newly created
processes from execve’s arguments and keep a list of all processes that we
want to track. This way we can track execution of sub-processes that are
created by the malicious application.
4.5 Transparent Event Forwarding
The main role of MAVMM is to log actions executed by the guest running
on top of it. For most of the time, MAVMM intercepts an event, log it,
and then forward it to the guest as if no interception has occurred. Hard-
ware virtualization offers support for forwarding some types of events, such
as interrupt and exception. But the range of events that MAVMM needs
to intercept is broader than that. For example, MAVMM intercepts IRET
instruction and modification of CR3 to track system call return value and
process switch accordingly. Since forwading of those two events is not sup-
ported, it would be very complex if MAVMM tries to simulate those events
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by itself. To get around this, we implement a transparent event forwarding
mechanism using the single stepping TF flag in rflags register. When IRET
or CR3 modification takes place, MAVMM logs the event, disables intercep-
tion for that particular event, and then sets TF flag to 1 before returning
control to the guest. This way, the guest will receive the event without any
alteration. Right after the guest processes this event, a #DB single step-
ping exception will be raised and control is passed back to MAVMM. This
time, MAVMM resets TF and enable interception for the event again. This
technique works well for most interceptions except interrupt and exception,
because the CPU will reset TF flag at the beginning and restore it at the
end of those two events. As a result, #DB exception will not be raised after
the first instruction within the interrupt or exception handler, and MAVMM
will not be able to reestablish its interception immediately as expected. For-
tunately, forwarding of those two events is already supported by hardware
virtualization.
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CHAPTER 5
EVALUATION
We have evaluated MAVMM in three aspects: functionality, detectability,
and performance. We executed our experiments inside the AMD Simnow
simulator, which simulates a machine with 900Mhz processor and 256MB of
RAM. We ran Simnow on a 2.40GHz Intel(R) Core(TM)2 CPU with 2.5GB
of RAM, on top ofx86 64 Ubuntu Linux 8.04, kernel version 2.6.24-24.
5.1 Functionality
5.1.1 Fine-grained tracking
MAVMM has the ability to extract very fine-grained information regarding
the program under analysis. It can intercept every guest instruction, fetch
and display the opcode, CPU registers and other states. This is equivalent
to the amount of information we can get from a runtime debugger. However,
MAVMM offers much better transparency and protection since it operates
totally outside the guest. Figure 5.1 shows a portion of the execution trace
******* GUEST STATE *********
cs:ip = 0x73:0xb7ed3b8c
ss:sp = 0x7b:0xbfdc3c84
ds:bp = 0x7b:0xbfdc3ca0
eax = 0x4, ebx = 0x0, ecx = 0x1, edx = 0xb7f52000
esi = 0xd, edi = 0xb7f52000cpl=0x3
cr0=0x8005003b, cr3=0x0, cr4=0xf1fc000
rflags=0x346, efer=0x0
4 bytes opcode: 0xcd 0x80 0x5b 0x3d
>> write( filename: stdout, size: 0xd, content
written [Hello world!] )
>> syscall return: 0xd
******* GUEST STATE *********
...
Figure 5.1: MAVMM logs: Trace of a simple program, high level system
calls are combined with fine-grained execution trace.
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when we monitor a simple “Hello world” program. This information can be
forwarded to a dissasember for further analysis, or it can be combined with
high-level data such as system call traces, to give a clearer picture of the mal-
ware as shown in the figure. With fine-grained tracking capability, MAVMM
can also be used as a universal unpacker, similar to Ether [14]. The idea is
simple: track all memory addresses to which the monitored guest program
writes, and raise an alert when it tries to execute dynamically generated
code.
5.1.2 High-level tracking
To test high-level extraction capability of MAVMM, we monitored the boot-
ing process of tty Linux 8.0. During this process, MAVMM intercepted a
total of 21953 system calls. Among those system calls 126 are execve; they
were called to execute binary programs such as hotplug, chmod, cat, date,
stty, mount and ifconfig. Other system calls that we recorded include read,
write, mmap2, ioctl, open and close.
We also reverse-engineered a simple malware to show how our system would
work in practice. In order to to this, we downloaded nearly 67000 malware
from VXNetlux [47] and used the latest version of ClamAV [48] to remove
known samples. Among the remaining ones, we selected a malware named
’Rootkit.Linux.Agent.30.Chsh’ due to its small size of roughly 138KB. We en-
abled system call tracking for this specific process and ran it inside MAVMM
with tty Linux 8.0 as our guest OS. We will describe our findings here briefly;
the full log can be found in the Appendix of the thesis. By looking at its
output messages, we suspect that this rootkit will replace root’s shell with a
malicious shell so that it gets executed everytime root account logins. But
we do not know what the malware actually does or how it achieves its goal.
As it turns out, this rootkit tries to change the content of /etc/passwd. Fur-
ther analysis reveals that the malware does not modify /etc/passwd directly;
it creates and operates on a temporary copy at /etc/ptmp instead. This is
perhaps to prevent possible errors in the process from destroying the origi-
nal file, and creating undesired suspicion. After the shell has been changed,
the original /etc/passwd is copied to /etc/passwd∼ and then get replaced by
the modified /etc/ptmp. Those actions are performed using link and unlink
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system calls, as shown in Figure 5.2.
>> unlink( Filename: /etc/passwd~ )
>> link( Old Filename: /etc/passwd, New Filename:
/etc/passwd~ )
>> unlink( Filename: /etc/passwd )
>> link( Old Filename: /etc/ptmp, New Filename:
/etc/passwd )
>> unlink( Filename: /etc/ptmp )
Figure 5.2: MAVMM logs: Rootkit.Linux.Agent.30.Chsh replaces
/etc/passwd through a combination of link and unlink system calls
5.2 Detectability & Security
We evaluated MAVMM against well-known VMM detection techniques and
compared the result with other VMMs such as VMWare, Virtual PC and Xen.
The first detection techniques we tested is Red Pill [15]. The idea behind
it is very simple: use a sensitive but non-privileged instruction to expose
a VMM artifact. Hypervisors such as VMWare and Virtual PC virtualize
and relocate the guest interrupt descriptor table (IDT) to a high memory
address. Red Pill checks the address stored in IDTR by using the SIDT in-
struction. If the address stored in IDTR is higher than a certain value, Red
Pill concludes that it is running in guest mode, inside a VMM. MAVMM,
on the other hand, does not need to modify the IDT table or change value
of guest’s IDTR, and thus Red Pill is not able to detect MAVMM. Quist
and Smith [9] proposed a similar idea, which checks the value of local de-
scriptor table register. We implemented this detection and verified that it
is able to detect several other VMMs, but fails to detect MAVMM. We also
experimented with some VMM specific detection techniques. For example,
VMWare use a special IO port to communicate with the guest. By testing
whether this communication is possible, an attacker can detect the presence
of VMWare [16]. Virtual PC can also be detected in a similar way [16]. Xen
provides modified software MMU architecture, which extends the CPU to
improve performance. Therefore Xen, both para-virtualized and hardware-
supported versions, can be detected by checking Xen CPUID extensions [49].
It is obvious that MAVMM cannot be detected using these techniques. Fi-
nally, we tested MAVMM with the machine state word (MSW) detection
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technique [50]. This technique can detect fully virtualized VMWare, which
cannot be detected by IDT check. The results of our experiments are shown
in Table 5.1. As we can see, MAVMM is not susceptible to any of these
mechanisms while VMWare, Virtual PC and Xen were susceptible to some
of them.
Detection Technique VMWare Virtual PC Xen PV Xen HVM MAVMM
Red Pill (IDT Check) detected detected detected x x
LDT Check detected detected detected x x
VMWare I/O Channel detected x x x x
Virtual PC Special Inst. x detected x x x
MSW Check detected x x x x
Xen CPUID Check x x detected detected x
Table 5.1: Effectiveness of VMM detection techniques (x means not
detected)
Even though implemented instances of the TLB profiling attack [12] cannot
detect MAVMM, we think that the general idea behind it deserves more dis-
cussion. In a virtualized environment, both the VMM and the guest compete
for the same set of TLB entries. The guest could execute several different
types of TLB profiling. One method is to fill all TBL entries, then measure
how long it would take to access memory in two different runs: before entering
to and after exiting from the hypervisor. If some of the entries filled by the
guest get replaced by the VMM, the second run will experience cache misses
and take longer to execute [21]. In all scenarios, the guest has to create a
#VMEXIT so that hypervisor mode is entered. To achieve higher detection
accuracy, this event should not be intercepted by the guest OS, i.e. it is not
privileged, otherwise it would be unclear wether the guest OS or the hyper-
visor caused the timing disparity. Since MAVMM does not support multiple
guest VM instances and virtual device emulation, it has no need to virtualize
non-privilege instructions such as SIDT or SLDT. It should be much more
difficult, if not impossible, to detect MAVMM using TLB profiling attack.
Furthermore, MAVMM occupies a much smaller code region than general
purpose VMMs, and therefore it will overwrite fewer TLB entries, making
this attack more error-prone.
Nevertheless, complete undetectability is like a panacea. We speculate that
a carefully implemented and specially targeted external timing attack [51] can
be used to detect all VMMs, including our hypervisor. However, such attacks
are very complex and expensive. It requires root privilege, a huge amount of
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CPU cycles, an external timing source and some prior knowledge about the
target system. This goes directly against common malware’s incentive to be
stealthy and remains undetected for a longer period of time and therefore is
unlikely to get implemented in practice. Additionally, the growing usage of
VMMs in general purpose operating systems, such as the upcoming version
of Windows Server, will make VMM detection irrelevant. This will force
attackers to instead focus on the more difficult problem of analyzer detection.
The size of trusted computing base is an important factor to consider
when evaluating a system’s security. Simplicity makes it easier to avoid
bugs, and to formally verify desired properties of the system. Our current
implementation consists of 182 lines of assembly and 3913 lines of C code for
the hypervisor, and 75 lines of C code for the user control interface. After
compiled, the MAVMM hypervisor is only 124KB. Our code base is 3 to 4
order of magnitude smaller than commodity VMMs such as Xen or VMWare
Workstation, which contain a host OS with millions of lines of code inside
their TCB.
5.3 Performance Overhead
Even though performance overhead is not our main concern, we want make
sure that it can be kept reasonable. We evaluated MAVMM’s performance
by measuring execution time of different types of programs inside (in both
compact mode and full mode), and outside the hypervisor. We ran each
program five times and show the average of all runs in Figure 5.3. First,
we ran two I/O intensive programs, one reads (read) and the other writes
(write) one million bytes to the disk. Then we executed another program
that makes 1000 getpid() system calls and print out the result to the screen
(syscall). Lastly, we ran a CPU intensive program that execute one million
add instructions (cpu). As we expected, the last program does not experience
any performance penalty since all executed operations are non-privilege. The
result shows that MAVMM, when running in compact mode, induces very
negligible overhead: 0% for read and cpu, 2.3% for write and 3.1% for syscall.
However, the extra cost in full mode is much more significant: 46.5%, 100%,
and 78.1% for write, read and syscall respectively. Further investigation re-
veals the main source of overhead is the serial port communication. Our
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Figure 5.3: MAVMM performance overhead. Each group has three bars.
First bar is execution time when MAVMM is disabled, second bar with
MAVMM in compact mode, last bar with MAVMM in full mode, the upper
portion of this bar is additional delay incurred by serial port
communications
current implementation simply dumps all logged data to COM1. This step
takes up 70% to 77.8% of the three additional delays mentioned above. This
expense will be reduced significantly when we switch to usb logging and batch
data dumps rather than writing them as they happen. Since we have not
tried to optimize our code our code heavily, we believe that aggressive opti-
mization, such as using local caching, will achieve even better performance.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we design, implement, and evaluate the architecture of MAVMM,
a lightweight VMM designed specially for malware analysis. MAVMM does
not implement unnecessary virtualization features commonly found in gen-
eral purpose hypervisors. Hardware virtualization support offers MAVMM
simplicity, security and transparency. We proved that our system can ex-
tract useful information, and that it is not susceptible to known virtualiza-
tion detection techniques. Thus, it can achieve higher accuracy than current
state-of-the-art malware analysis platforms.
Another important goal that we started with was to provide the research
community with a simple and easy-to-enhance hardware-supported virtu-
alization framework. This framework could be useful for prototyping new
functionality below OS level. Such services include OS debugging, security
auditing, logging, and replaying, etc. By being simple (around 4000 lines
of code) and well documented (even larger amount of comments), MAVMM
makes it easy for other researchers to add new functions to it, or modify it to
serve their purposes. Our implementation of MAVMM and updates on our
project can be found at mavmm.sourceforge.net
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APPENDIX A
LOGGING SYSTEM CALLS OF A
ROOTKIT
+++++ process name: sh
+++++ process name: sh
+++++ process name: sh
+++++ process name: rootkit
process tracked
>> fstat( filename: stdout, Addr to Stat Structure: 0xbf80803c )
>> mmap( Starting Addr: 0xbf807ff8, Length: 0x3, MEM Protection: 0xbf807ff8, Flag: 0xffffffff,
Offset: 0xbf808010 )
>> ioctl( filename: stdout, Device-dependent request code: 0x5401, Memory Addr: 0xbf808000 )
>> write( filename: stdout, size: 0x19, content written [Changing shell for root.] )
>> fstat( filename: stdin, Addr to Stat Structure: 0xbf808528 )
>> mmap( Starting Addr: 0xbf8084e4, Length: 0x3, MEM Protection: 0xbf8084e4, Flag: 0xffffffff,
Offset: 0xbf8084fc )
>> ioctl( filename: stdin, Device-dependent request code: 0x5401, Memory Addr: 0xbf8084ec )
>> write( filename: stdout, size: 0x15, content written [New shell [/bin/sh]: ot.
] )
>> read( filename: stdin, buffer: 0xb7f6d000, size: 0x400 )
+++++ process name: sh
+++++ process name: rootkit
process tracked
sys_read return value: 0x2f
>> access( Filename to check: /bin/mal-sh, Mode: File exists )
>> access( Filename to check: /bin/mal-sh, Mode: Executable )
>> open( filename: /etc/shells, flags: 0x0, mode: 0x1b6 )
>> open( filename: /etc/ptmp, flags: 0xc1, mode: 0x1a4 )
>> lchown( Filename: /etc/ptmp, Owner ID: 0x0, Group ID: 0x0 )
>> fcntl( 0x3, 0x3, 0x0 )
>> fstat( filename: /etc/ptmp, Addr to Stat Structure: 0xbf8084a8 )
>> mmap( Starting Addr: 0xbf808464, Length: 0x3, MEM Protection: 0xbf808464, Flag: 0xffffffff,
Offset: 0xbf80847c )
>> lseek( filename: /etc/ptmp, Offset: 0x0, whence: 0x1 )
>> open( filename: /etc/passwd, flags: 0x0, mode: 0x1b6 )
>> fstat( filename: /etc/passwd, Addr to Stat Structure: 0xbf80848c )
>> mmap( Starting Addr: 0xbf808448, Length: 0x3, MEM Protection: 0xbf808448, Flag: 0xffffffff,
Offset: 0xbf808460 )
>> read( filename: /etc/passwd, buffer: 0xb7f6b000, size: 0x400 )
sys_read return value: 0x400
>> read( filename: /etc/passwd, buffer: 0xb7f6b000, size: 0x400 )
sys_read return value: 0x0
>> write( filename: /etc/ptmp, size: 0x182, content written [root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/mal-sh
bin:*:1:1:bin:/bin:/bin/false
daemon:*:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/bin/false
adm:*:4:4:adm:/var/adm:/bin/false
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lp:*:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/false
httpd:*:41:41:HTTP Daemon:/var/lib/httpd:/bin/false
ftpd:*:42:42:FTP Daemon:/var/lib/ftpd:/bin/false
sshd:*:42:42:SSH PrivSep Daemon:/var/lib/sshd:/bin/false
nobody:*:65534:65534:nobody:/var/lib/nobody:/bin/false
] )
>> close( filename: /etc/ptmp )
>> munmap( Starting Addr: 0xb7f6c000, Length: 0x1000 )
+++++ process name: rootkit
process tracked
>> close( filename: /etc/ptmp )
>> close( filename: /etc/passwd )
>> munmap( Starting Addr: 0xb7f6b000, Length: 0x1000 )
+++++ process name: rootkit
process tracked
>> unlink( Filename: /etc/passwd )
>> link( Old Filename: /etc/passwd, New Filename: /etc/passwd )
>> unlink( Filename: /etc/passwd )
>> link( Old Filename: /etc/ptmp, New Filename: /etc/passwd )
>> unlink( Filename: /etc/ptmp )
>> write( filename: stdout, size: 0xf, content written [Shell changed.
/sh]: ot.
] )
>> exit( 0x0 )
+++++ process name: rootkit
process tracked
+++++ process name: rootkit
process tracked
+++++ process name: sh
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